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Introduction
New business models are needed for small suppliers of 
network security processors and specialized security 
products. The conventional business models in use 
today favour large, established incumbents who devel-
op products for large and well-understood markets. 
Ideally, new business models would enable and reward 
continuous innovation by both large and small compan-
ies to produce a continuous stream of novel security 
products for niche markets. The beneficiaries would in-
clude the buyers of specialized cybersecurity products 
and their users, the technology entrepreneurs who de-
velop and commercialize specialized security products, 
and the engineers and product designers with a broader 
range of employment and contracting opportunities.
Network security processors are critical components of high-performance systems built 
for cybersecurity. Development of a network security processor requires multi-domain ex-
perience in semiconductors and complex software security applications, and multiple iter-
ations of both software and hardware implementations. Limited by the business models in 
use today, such an arduous task can be undertaken only by large incumbent companies 
and government organizations. Neither the “fabless semiconductor” models nor the silic-
on intellectual-property licensing (“IP-licensing”) models allow small technology compan-
ies to successfully compete. This article describes an alternative approach that produces 
an ongoing stream of novel network security processors for niche markets through con-
tinuous innovation by both large and small companies. This approach, referred to here as 
the "business ecosystem model for network security processors", includes a flexible and re-
configurable technology platform, a “keystone” business model for the company that 
maintains the platform architecture, and an extended ecosystem of companies that both 
contribute and share in the value created by innovation. New opportunities for business 
model innovation by participating companies are made possible by the ecosystem model. 
This ecosystem model builds on: i) the lessons learned from the experience of the first au-
thor as a senior integrated circuit architect for providers of public-key cryptography solu-
tions and as the owner of a semiconductor startup, and ii) the latest scholarly research on 
technology entrepreneurship, business models, platforms, and business ecosystems. This 
article will be of interest to all technology entrepreneurs, but it will be of particular interest 
to owners of small companies that provide security solutions and to specialized security 
professionals seeking to launch their own companies.
Your ability to negotiate, communicate, influence, and 
persuade others to do things is absolutely indispensable to 
everything you accomplish in life. The most effective men 
and women in every area are those who can quite 
competently organize the cooperation and assistance of 
other people toward the accomplishment of important 
goals and objectives.
Brian Tracy
Entrepreneur, business coach, author, and speaker
“ ”
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Network security processors are specialized compon-
ents of high-performance security systems used by or-
ganizations such as banks, government embassies, and 
multinational corporations. They provide acceleration 
of the cryptography functions that encrypt and decrypt 
outgoing and incoming information and protect against 
intrusion by adversaries. Security systems with hard-
ware acceleration have greater performance than sys-
tems that implement the cryptography functions in 
software, but are more costly and require more time 
and specialized expertise to develop, implement, and 
deploy.
There are two broad categories of business models in 
use today for providers of network security processors 
and the security products that employ them. Both cat-
egories favour large multinational incumbents such as 
IBM (ibm.com), Hewlett-Packard (hp.com), Bull SAS 
(bull.com), SafeNet (safenet-inc.com), and Thales Group 
(thalesgroup.com) rather than small companies and new 
entrants. “Fabless semiconductor” models require com-
mitment of large up-front capital, exposing investors to 
significant risk. Silicon “IP-licensing” models prevent 
the small company from interacting directly with cus-
tomers and end-users, and because the customer rela-
tionship is owned by the systems integrator who 
packages the complete solution, small suppliers cannot 
easily appropriate a significant portion of the value that 
their innovations create for customers. 
This article contributes an alternative approach that we 
refer to here as the "business ecosystem model for net-
work security processors". It builds on lessons learned 
from the industry experience of the first author and im-
plements concepts from the latest scholarly research on 
technology entrepreneurship (Bailetti, 2012: timreview.ca/
article/520; Bailetti et al., 2012: 557), business models 
(Muegge, 2012: 545; Bailetti, 2009: 226), platforms and 
keystones (Bailetti, 2010; 355), and business ecosystems 
(Muegge, 2013: 655; Muegge, 2011: 495; Bailetti, 2010: 325; 
Carbone, 2009: 227; Hurley, 2009: 276; Bailetti, 2008: 138). 
This approach has several parts, including a network se-
curity processor platform that companies can use and 
reconfigure to build innovative security solutions for 
niche markets, a keystone business model for the com-
pany that leads platform maintenance and evolution, 
and a business ecosystem of companies that develop 
complementary products, services, and technologies, 
contribute assets to the platform, and build security 
products that utilize the platform. The ecosystem ap-
proach enables new business models for participating 
companies. Building solutions on top of the proposed 
platform does not require the sale of large volumes to 
generate profits. Moreover, it allows small companies to 
interact directly with end-customers and retain the 
rights over the intellectual property they create.
The body of this article is structured in four sections. 
The first section reviews the conventional business 
models used by providers of network security pro-
cessors and discusses their weaknesses and limitations. 
The second section presents lessons learned from the 
industrial experience of the first author as a crypto-
graphy chip designer and entrepreneur. The third sec-
tion builds on the lessons learned to develop the 
business ecosystem model for network security pro-
cessors; it explains the business model of the ecosystem 
keystone, the technology that supports the ecosystem, 
and the new opportunities for business model innova-
tion by companies participating in the ecosystem. The 
fourth section concludes with a renewed call for innova-
tion in the cybersecurity domain – not only of novel 
technology but also of novel business models that fully 
exploit the opportunities enabled by technological in-
novation.
Conventional Business Models
A business model provides a concise explanation of how 
a business operates. Many business model frameworks 
have been proposed. This article employs the techno-
logy entrepreneurship framework previously published 
in the TIM Review (Muegge, 2012; timreview.ca/
article/545) and employed with technology entrepreneurs 
in the Lead to Win ecosystem (Bailetti and Bot, 2013;
timreview.ca/article/658). Although each company's busi-
ness model may comprise a unique combination of cus-
tomer pain points, stakeholder value propositions, a 
profit formula of revenues and costs, and the company's 
capabilities, it is often useful to identify and label groups 
of business models that share some similar features. 
The three groups of interest in this section are: i) integ-
rated device manufacturers, ii) fabless semiconductor 
companies, and iii) silicon IP-licensing companies. 
Prior to the 1980s, most companies that developed in-
tegrated circuit devices were integrated device manufac-
turers. Vertically integrated firms would own and 
control their own production facilities, including a 
foundry for fabricating semiconductor wafers, and per-
form basic research, product design, manufacturing, 
sales, and support – all in-house.
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Fabless semiconductor business models became pos-
sible in 1987 when the Taiwan Semiconductor Manu-
facturing Company (tsmc.com) first offered the use of an 
integrated circuits fabrication facility to companies 
who could design their own integrated circuits. Instead 
of investing billions of dollars up-front to acquire and 
operate an integrated circuits fabrication facility, a fab-
less semiconductor company could acquire electronic 
design automation (EDA) software, employ engineers 
to design integrated circuits using the EDA software, 
and outsource the manufacturing to others. The non-re-
coverable engineering costs to produce a new integ-
rated circuit must be recouped from product sales. To 
be profitable, a fabless semiconductor company re-
quires high sales volumes – typically in the tens of thou-
sands or hundreds of thousands of units.
Silicon IP-licensing business models require a company 
to license modular design units to become parts of in-
tegrated circuits designed by others. An IP-licensing 
company generates revenue from some combination of 
fixed fees per unit of intellectual property and royalties 
paid per device manufactured. ARM Holdings (arm.com) 
was the first company to successfully employ a busi-
ness model with IP-licensing. ARM developed a “soft” 
reduced instruction set (RISC) microprocessor design 
that customers could license and embed within their in-
tegrated circuit designs to control applications-specific 
logic. The consumer electronics market grew rapidly 
when highly integrated microchips with embedded 
ARM processors enabled significant cost and size reduc-
tions. Smart, hand-held communications-enabled 
devices, such as cell phones, moved from science fic-
tion to fact almost overnight. By 2012, ARM was em-
ploying more than 2000 people and ARM's partners had 
shipped more than 30 billion ARM-based integrated cir-
cuits (ARM Annual Report, 2012; tinyurl.com/kvgzuf6). 
Despite these large-company successes, neither the fab-
less semiconductor models nor the IP-licensing models 
are appealing for small providers of security solutions – 
for reasons developed in the next section. 
Background and Lessons Learned
The business model insights and platform architecture 
that enable the business ecosystem model for network 
security processors have evolved over the past 13 years. 
In 2000, Chrysalis-ITS extended its business of develop-
ing specialized hardware and software for the public-
key infrastructure (PKI) market by opening a fabless 
semiconductor division to develop a high-performance 
line of network security processors as "systems on 
chips". Chrysalis-ITS's first system on a chip, the Luna 
340, integrated five microprocessors with instruction 
sets extended to implement a number of important se-
curity operations, such as Internet Protocol Security 
(IPSec) and the RSA public-key cryptographic (PKC) al-
gorithm. Both are used in banking networks and Inter-
net security based on the secure socket layer (SSL) 
protocol. In 2001, Chrysalis-ITS introduced the Luna 
510, a product that delivered 100 times greater perform-
ance than the Luna 340. One microprocessor provided 
SSL-protocol control and data-flow management 
between multiple instances of highly optimized encryp-
tion and hashing algorithm processors. In 2004, 
Chrysalis-ITS was acquired by Rainbow Technologies, 
which then merged with SafeNet (safenet-inc.com). In 
2007, Elliptic Technologies (elliptictech.com) developed a 
public-key cryptographic algorithm compute engine. 
The engine was based on an arithmetic logic unit de-
signed to flexibly compute over any integer size up to 
thousands of bits the modular arithmetic functions that 
are the basis for security applications based on public-
key cryptography. In 2009, Crack Semiconductor (crack
semi.com), a company founded by the first author of this 
article, developed a scalable, modular architecture for 
optimally computing these modular arithmetic func-
tions in a very low-cost field-programmable gate array 
(FPGA). The architecture was refined over several gen-
erations so that current implementations rival the per-
formance of the Luna 510 when coupled to an 
embedded applications processor. The proposed plat-
form of the business ecosystem model for network se-
curity processors is an implementation of the next 
generation in the evolution of this architecture.
The first author’s industry experience as a designer and 
entrepreneur suggests five lessons for small suppliers of 
security solutions, each of which is expanded upon in 
the subsections that follow:
1. Control the key technology components that differen-
tiate your business from others.
2. Avoid fabless semiconductor models for small mar-
kets.
3. Go after niche markets that are unattractive to large 
incumbents. 
4. Implement the best-available design methodologies, 
tools, algorithms, and architectures. 
5. Look to emerging industry standards for global op-
portunities to innovate.
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1. Control the key technology components that differenti-
ate your business from others
Silicon IP-licensing models place the IP supplier in a 
subordinate role in the value chain; from a subordinate 
role, it is difficult to charge license fees that are high 
enough to recoup R&D costs. ARM has been very suc-
cessful with IP-licensing for high-volume consumer 
devices, but comparable mass-market sales volumes 
are not feasible for security applications. Furthermore, 
the downstream systems integrator controls the rela-
tionship with customers and end-users. For these reas-
ons, silicon IP-licensing models are not appealing for 
small providers of security solutions.
The Luna 510 provides a cautionary tale regarding IP li-
censing and loss of control of key technology compon-
ents. The Luna 510 was a technological breakthrough in 
network security processor design, but failed to reach 
the market when the Luna 340 failed. Despite the viabil-
ity of the Luna 510 design, investors shut down the en-
tire semiconductor division when it became clear that 
the sunk costs of the Luna 340 project would produce 
no revenue. Furthermore, the entirely independent and 
original in-house development of the Luna 510 was 
tainted by a clause in the Luna 340 development con-
tract with a third-party that assigned a small but mean-
ingful right to “derivative works” to the third-party. 
Because the IP was “tainted” with unquantified legal is-
sues, new investors were unwilling to recapitalize the 
semiconductor division as a separate company. Thus, 
due to factors outside the control of the development 
team – in particular, the failure of another product and 
the loss of control over intellectual property – the Luna 
510 was never produced.
2. Avoid fabless semiconductor models for small markets
Fabless semiconductor models incur high R&D costs 
and non-recoverable engineering costs to produce a 
custom integrated circuit. To recoup these costs, reven-
ues must be in the hundreds of millions of dollars, 
which requires in-depth market knowledge, large sales 
volumes of tens or hundreds of thousands of units or 
very high selling prices and profit margins, and venture-
capital or other institutional backing. Opportunities 
with these characteristics are rare for small providers of 
security technologies. 
PMC-Sierra (pmcs.com) is an example of a successful fab-
less semiconductor company. PMC-Sierra achieves 
sales in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year by 
providing high-performance optical-networking integ-
rated circuits to large telecommunications equipment 
manufacturers such as Cisco Systems (cisco.com) and 
Huawei (huawei.com). Development of a new integrated 
circuit may cost PMC-Sierra $30 million to design, and 
it may incur $3 million in non-recoverable engineering 
charges. The integrated circuit design will be developed 
to a specification that meets the needs of several key cli-
ents, and features are included based on significant 
volume commitments. Like other companies employ-
ing fabless semiconductor models, PMC-Sierra as-
sumes significant risk and revenue loss if the integrated 
circuit design is late or fails to function as specified.
3. Go after niche markets that are unattractive to large 
incumbents
Large incumbents employing either silicon IP-licensing 
models (such as ARM in the consumer products mar-
ket) or fabless semiconductor models (such as PMC-Si-
erra in the telecommunications equipment market) 
cannot be profitable in small niche markets where their 
high cost structures and requirements for large sales 
volumes become a liability. Markets that are unattract-
ive to large incumbents such as ARM and PMC-Sierra 
are an opportunity for small security providers – if 
those companies can be profitable at small-to-medium 
sales volumes. 
Going after niche markets of a thousand units or a hun-
dred units is not possible with the same technology and 
business models used today by incumbents; innovation 
is required in both the technology and business models 
used by small security providers.
4. Implement the best-available design methodologies, 
tools, algorithms, and architectures
Technology failure guarantees business model failure. 
Getting the technology right is necessary but not suffi-
cient for success.
The Luna 340 network security processor is an example 
of what can go wrong when companies do not imple-
ment the most appropriate design methodologies, 
tools, and algorithms, and architectures. A team of en-
gineers worked for several years to design and imple-
ment the Luna 340. Several early management 
decisions, intended to reduce costs and eliminate steps, 
became serious problems late in the development pro-
cess. To save money on expensive EDA software li-
censes, a critical integrated circuit layout tool was not 
upgraded. Fatal circuit-timing errors were introduced, 
which the tool upgrade would have detected and fixed. 
A second design iteration – an expensive and time-con-
suming redesign of the integrated circuit – also failed to 
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get the timing right. These problems were further com-
pounded by other performance-degrading design flaws 
and by an inefficient architecture. In contrast, the tech-
nically successful Luna 510 employed more efficient ar-
chitectures for a faster and more physically controllable 
hardware implementation, state-of-the-art synthesis al-
gorithms for placement and routing, and a prototyping 
methodology including verification in full-speed FPGA-
based prototypes, then in fabrication “shuttles” (where 
many companies would share a silicon wafer) before 
commitment to the full fabrication and manufacturing 
process. These design methodologies, tools, algorithms, 
and architectures could have been employed from the 
beginning of the Luna 340 project; cuttings costs in 
these areas was very costly later. Past research on 
product development has consistently found that great-
er early investment in architecture and flexibility results 
in better-performing projects (e.g., MacCormack et al., 
2001; tinyurl.com/am6axfs) and the experience of the Luna 
340 developers supports these findings. Greater upfront 
exploration of architecture and algorithms and upfront 
adoption of appropriate tools and prototyping method-
ologies could have avoided the costly delays that 
happened later. 
For a conventional integrated circuit design, these up-
front items appear as “sunk costs” to be minimized by 
management. However, when innovation occurs within 
and on top of a platform – the ecosystem approach re-
commended here – design methodologies, tools, al-
gorithms, and architectures are investments in the 
future, to be recouped over many niche custom designs 
and derivative products.
5. Look to emerging industry standards for global oppor-
tunities to innovate
Small companies need to address opportunities that 
are global rather than local or regional (Tanev, 2012;
timreview.ca/article/532), and emerging industry standards 
can provide insights into global opportunities. An ex-
ample is the new ISA100.11a standard (isa.org/ISA100-11a) 
for wireless sensor networks. ISA100.11a differs from 
WirelessHART, a competing standard from the HART 
Communications Foundation (hartcomm.org), by includ-
ing the option to use public-key cryptography techno-
logy for the provisioning of new devices joining the 
network. Because ISA100.11a is a new standard, and 
public-key cryptography is optional rather than re-
quired, few vendors are implementing this option in 
their first-generation ISA100.11a- and WirelessHART-
compliant products. However, activity within the stand-
ards groups suggests that public-key cryptography will 
become increasingly important in the future: the Inter-
national Society for Automation (isa.org), steward of the 
ISA standards, is also pursuing standardization of pub-
lic-key cryptography technology in many areas, for ex-
ample, to enable over-the-air (OTA) provisioning of 
devices. Participation in standards development can 
provide small security providers with valuable insights 
into possible futures, as well as opportunities to gain 
early access to information, build relationships with po-
tential collaborators, shape requirements, and influ-
ence the technical direction of standards. 
Participation in industry standards development has 
traditionally been a gamble for small companies using 
conventional business models. Costs include money 
and time, and the outcome is always uncertain: stand-
ards can fail for technical or political reasons, or adop-
ters may converge on a different competing standard. 
However, the payoffs can be large. For example, Crack 
Semiconductor has developed security technologies 
ahead of an expected global market for wireless sensor 
networks for industry control (Low, 2013; timreview.ca/
article/682). Furthermore, a business ecosystem ap-
proach to developing security products can substan-
tially reduce the costs and risk of participating in 
standards development while retaining all the potential 
benefits. Participation in the development of the 
ISA100.11a standard is an important aspect of Crack 
Semiconductor's network security processor platform 
strategy. Other companies in the ecosystem benefit 
from the information and influence while sharing the 
costs and obligations.
In summary, for small companies of security solutions 
to compete successfully with established incumbents, a 
new approach is needed. That new approach should ad-
dress global opportunities in niche markets, using the 
best-available design methodologies, tools, algorithm, 
and architectures, with business models unlike those 
commonly in use today by large incumbents. The next 
session describes one such approach.
An Alternative Approach: The Business 
Ecosystem Model
Business ecosystems provide a way for small compan-
ies to achieve more, learn faster, and reach farther than 
otherwise possible, while sharing risks and costs with 
others (Muegge, 2013; timreview.ca/article/655). Hurley 
(2009; timreview.ca/article/276) identifies several benefits 
enjoyed by participating entrepreneurs, including re-
duced barriers to market entry, increased access to cus-
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tomers, reduced operating costs, and the means to 
overcome regional limitations. Carbone (2009; timreview
.ca/article/227) argues that business ecosystems can also 
enable business model innovation, especially by com-
panies providing complementary assets.
Business ecosystem approaches have been previously 
developed for various domains, including job creation 
through technology entrepreneurship (e.g., the Lead to 
Win ecosystem: leadtowin.ca; Bailetti and Bot, 2013:
timreview.ca/article/658), community development of open 
source software tools and frameworks (e.g., the Eclipse 
ecosystem: eclipse.org; Muegge, 2011; timreview.ca/article/
495), and communication-enabled applications (e.g., 
the Coral CEA ecosystem; coralcea.ca; Pyke, 2010; timreview
.ca/article/347). This article is the first known application 
of the business ecosystem approach to the domain of 
network security processors. However, the basic 
premise is similar to that of these other domains: eco-
system participants innovate together to solve bigger 
network-security problems that any one small or medi-
um-sized company could address on its own. 
As in other domains, the business ecosystem model for 
network security processors has several codependent 
parts. The most essential components in this domain 
are: i) a keystone company that owns, operates, and 
evolves the platform; ii) a platform of modular techno-
logy building blocks that others can utilize, build on, 
and contribute to; and iii) a network of participating 
companies that can innovate in new ways. Below, each 
component is briefly described in its own subsection.
Keystone business model
The keystone is the company that owns, operates, and 
evolves the platform (Bailetti, 2010; timreview.ca/article/
355). The keystone plays a central role; for this ecosys-
tem model to succeed, there must be a keystone busi-
ness model that earns attractive profits for the keystone 
company.
Table 1 compares the proposed business model of the 
ecosystem keystone with the conventional fabless semi-
conductor business models and IP-licensing business 
models described in previous sections. The rows in 
Table 1 are a subset of the components of the techno-
logy entrepreneurship business model framework, se-
lected to emphasize the salient differences. There are 
many similarities not shown in the table; for example, 
all three models are different ways of addressing the 
same basic “pain points” of cybersecurity.
Consistent with lesson 1, the keystone controls the key 
components of the technology platform – especially the 
cryptography algorithms, hardware acceleration, and 
platform architecture (described in the second subsec-
tion) – while enabling complementary innovation by 
other companies. Incentives are aligned, because suc-
cess of the keystone business model critically depends 
on success by participating companies (described in 
the third subsection). Also consistent with lesson 1, par-
ticipating companies keep control of their own differen-
tiating innovations, with the option to selectively 
contribute specific innovations back to the platform for 
use by others.
Technology that supports the keystone business model
The platform that anchors a business ecosystem can 
take many different forms – including a product, pro-
cess, location, service, or technology (Bailetti, 2010;
timreview.ca/article/355). The platform for network security 
processors is the continued evolution of the architec-
ture previously described in the section on background 
and lessons learned. It provides the essential techno-
logy components of a network security processor, 
tested and verified together as a system, in a modular 
form that can be configured in different ways, and ex-
tended with new application-specific functionality im-
plemented in software. Cryptography functions are 
implemented in flexible programmable logic, avoiding 
the non-recoverable fixed costs of new custom silicon 
integrated circuits, while providing real-time perform-
ance far exceeding a software-only system on an em-
bedded microprocessor. Thus, a new design built on 
the platform can be profitable at much lower sales 
volumes than previously possible.
The platform is made possible by an innovative net-
work security processor architecture developed by 
Crack Semiconductor (cracksemi.com). The current imple-
mentation is built on the Xilinx (xilinx.com) Zynq Extens-
ible Processing platform (EPP; tinyurl.com/kecww6k), a 
flexible “system on a chip” that combines a large array 
of programmable logic with general purpose micropro-
cessors – more specifically, a hardened dual-core ARM-
9 processor. The first microprocessor runs an SSL soft-
ware library that interfaces to public-key cryptography 
algorithms implemented on the chip in programmable 
logic. The second microprocessor runs the software 
that provides custom requirements for specialized 
niche applications. The platform includes a default soft-
ware stack for the second processor that includes a 
Linux-based operating system, a suite of open source 
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Table 1. Comparison of network security processor business models
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middleware, and assorted security applications. A 
niche application could require a custom stack that re-
moves unneeded components, swaps out some com-
ponents for specialized substitutes, and adds new 
proprietary custom code.
Opportunities for ecosystem companies 
Participation in the network security processor ecosys-
tem is appealing for at least three categories of com-
pany: i) providers of specialized niche technologies 
that complement the platform assets; ii) system integ-
rators that build specialized security products on top of 
platform assets; and iii) demanding users of security 
products that participate in order to influence the evol-
ution of the platform and of products that build on the 
platform. Examples of platform complements include 
hardware and software interfaces and drivers, special-
ized software at the middleware and application layers 
of the stack, and new cryptographic algorithms; pro-
viders may choose to selectively contribute some tech-
nologies and assets into the platform for use by others, 
for example to stimulate demand for the provider's pro-
prietary products and services. Examples of demanding 
users of security products include banks and other fin-
ancial institutions, governments (especially military ap-
plications and government foreign offices), institutions 
in the medical industry, the operators of critical infra-
structure such as nuclear power facilities, and corpora-
tions. Such participants could be motivated to shape 
requirements, send strong signals of support, influence 
technical work with their investment, and gain early
access to information. These motivations are similar to 
those for companies to participate in standards groups 
(lesson 5). 
The network security processor ecosystem enables new 
opportunities for business model innovation by parti-
cipating firms of all three categories identified previ-
ously (providers of complements, providers of security 
products, and demanding users). Returning to the com-
ponents of the technology entrepreneurship business 
model framework (Muegge, 2012; timreview.ca/article/545), 
participants can: i) gain access to new capabilities; ii) 
reduce cost structures; iii) enable new revenue streams; 
iv) reach new stakeholders with new and stronger value 
propositions; and v) address new problem spaces that 
would otherwise be unavailable.
Security products developed with this approach could 
be profitable at sales volumes of thousands or hun-
dreds of units – orders of magnitude below the minim-
um volumes required for security products using the 
conventional business models in use today. Providers 
can develop highly specialized niche products that 
would not otherwise be viable, for customers willing to 
pay high selling prices for dedicated solutions to their 
specialized security problems.
The network security processor ecosystem would be 
membership-based with restrictions and approvals re-
quired for entry. Closed membership is an important 
and necessary point of difference from, for example, the 
open ecosystems anchored around community-de-
veloped open source software where anyone can parti-
cipate (e.g., Muegge, 2011; timreview.ca/article/495). The 
most important factor requiring this difference is govern-
ment policy and regulation of cybersecurity technology: 
some nations regulate strong cryptography and the ex-
change of cryptography technology with other nations 
as a security concern. The United States, for example, 
has a body of rules including the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR; tinyurl.com/8l9zvhh), the United 
States Munitions List (USML; tinyurl.com/k8tvoj5), and the 
Arms Export Control Act (AECA; tinyurl.com/8yhb7wx), that 
have implications for international collaboration on cy-
bersecurity. Some engagements may require approval 
from one or multiple jurisdictions. The keystone com-
pany plays a central role in developing and maintaining 
the membership criteria and rules of conduct, in accord-
ance with the laws of its jurisdiction.
Conclusion
This article has argued that small innovative suppliers 
of network security processors and high-performance 
security applications that require network security pro-
cessors for hardware acceleration should consider form-
ing a business ecosystem. The configuration described 
here includes a platform of reconfigurable and extens-
ible network security processor technology, a business 
model for the keystone company that maintains and 
evolves the platform architecture, and a network of par-
ticipating companies that innovate within and on top of 
the platform. The ecosystem enables new opportunities 
for business model innovation by participating compan-
ies. Incentives are aligned: success of the keystone critic-
ally depends on the participation and business success 
of the companies that build on and contribute to the 
platform, including providers of niche security techno-
logies, providers of security products that utilize the 
platform, and demanding end-users of security 
products. The outcome is a continuous stream of secur-
ity innovation and of specialized security products – in-
cluding products with projected sales volumes in the 
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thousands or hundreds of units that are not economic-
ally viable with conventional business models. We call 
upon managers of companies large and small, and 
upon technology entrepreneurs seeking new opportun-
ities, to join us in making this happen.
This ecosystem model requires some aspects of the 
overall solution to be shared with collaborators and 
partners. The platform provides a high entry barrier 
that protects the ecosystem from competitors, because 
there is no disclosure of the proprietary acceleration 
technology that integrates high-performance crypto-
graphic compute offload processors with a low-level 
cryptographic library. Partners can therefore more rap-
idly develop advanced software solutions because they 
do not need to solve the optimization problems they 
would encounter if they had to develop their own net-
work security processor. The platform's value increases 
significantly due to the strong network effects that are 
associated with multiple third-parties developing soft-
ware that complements the platform.
We conclude with a renewed call for innovation in the 
cybersecurity domain. The technological challenges of 
cybersecurity have received much attention in this is-
sue of the TIM Review as well as within this article. But 
equally daunting are the business model challenges. 
Just as business model innovation is required to fully 
exploit the network security processor platform de-
scribed here, we expect that the commercial value of fu-
ture innovation in cybersecurity technology may 
remain latent and unrealized until it is unlocked by cor-
responding innovation in business models and com-
mercialization.
